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## QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW FINDINGS REPORT NO.: 2022-QAR-02

### Review of Agency level PYRL User ID's

The Post Audit Subsection of the Bureau of State Payrolls (BOSP) has completed a Statewide review of FLAIR PYRL User ID's as of February 1<sup>st</sup>, 2022.

#### Purpose

The objective of this review is to ensure that User ID's were being terminated immediately following employee separation, that accounts and user ID's were not being shared to bypass internal controls, and that they are being used in accordance with the recommended Payroll Preparation Manual guidelines and requirements within Volume V, Section 1.

#### Scope

All agencies statewide that have a minimum of one employee with access to the FLAIR/PYRL system, whether that be as an Access Control Custodian for the agency, or a production account with payroll processing functions.

#### Background

An on-line system must have security measures to prevent unauthorized persons from accessing computer files. Authorized personnel must be allowed access to only those files for which they have authority. This is achieved through the use of sign-on procedures and carefully controlled maintenance of the Access Control File.

The Access Control File contains the valid organization codes and initials of employees authorized to access the system. This file is checked each time an organization code, initials and password are entered, and access is not allowed if the entered organization code, initials and password are not included on the file. Also included on the file are the authorized functions for each organization code/initial combination. Access is allowed only to those functions that are included on the file for the entered organization code/initial combination.

There are two types of access: Access Control sign-on and Operating sign-on. The Access Control sign-on grants access only to the Access Control File and the Operating sign-on grants access only to operating files. A single sign-on cannot access both Access Control and Operating files.

## Methodology

The Post Audit Team obtained the list of all User ID's currently active from PYRL which details information such as User Group, Group Level, Org Code, User ID, ACC status, Name and Description. The data was collected for the report, on February 1<sup>st</sup>, 2022.

- All active PYRL Access Control User ID's (438 ID's) were the sample population for review.
- Each User ID was verified to have been established with the employee's initials (at least partial).
- Each employee's Access Control Custodian status was validated.
- Each employee's job status was reviewed via People First to ensure the employee was currently employed with the agency whom established the PYRL access. If not employed with that agency, their separation date was recorded, as well as the number of days since they left the agency (as of 2/1/22).

## Conclusions

A breakdown of findings below indicates findings that were encountered during the review. Out of 34 possible agencies and an additional grouping of Statewide Users, 23 agencies and the group of statewide users contained a finding. There was a total of 111 findings discovered within the 23 state agencies and group of statewide users. These 111 findings can be placed into one of the following categories:

1. Fails to meet PYRL description requirements per the Payroll Preparation Manual (Vol 5, Sec 1)
2. Separated Employees w/Active PYRL Access

This review did not identify any users with multiple accounts or agencies with shared or generic accounts.

- At least one finding was discovered in 23 of 34 state agencies. **(67.6%)**
- There were 111 findings across 438 PYRL ID's. **(25.3%)**
- 104 of the 111 **(93.7%)** findings do not meet PYRL description requirements described in the Payroll Preparation Manual.
- Four of the 111 findings **(1.6%)** are attributed to PYRL Users with active access that are not currently employed with that State Agency at the time of the review.
- In the 43 working days of February and March 2022 while this QAR was ongoing, there were 24 more user access additions (23) or deletions (1) where the Agency Custodian did not provide an employee ID.


### Does not meet PYRL description requirements per the Payroll Preparation Manual (Vol 5, Sec 1)

Agencies either did not provide an employee ID, mistakenly used a position ID or an appointment ID, or just entered an incorrect employee ID. 104 of the 111 agency findings are attributed to this category.

- 47 of the 104 accounts provide no Employee ID. **(45.2%)**
- 39 of the 104 accounts incorrectly list an Appointment ID **(37.5%)**
- **10.6%** of the 104 accounts incorrectly list a Position ID
- **6.7%** of the 104 accounts show an Incorrect Employee ID (7 accounts)

The Statewide user group contained 11 user accounts that are assigned to DFS' Office of information Technology (OIT) personnel and therefore restricted and cannot be updated by BOSPP, therefore were not included in the findings.

## Failure to meet PYRL Description Requirements, per the Payroll Preparation Manual



### Separated Employees w/Active PYRL Access (4)

Of the PYRL accesses reviewed, two employees no longer worked with the agency that created their access. A Department of Corrections employee moved to another state agency as of December 10<sup>th</sup>, 2021 and DOC did not remove the access. The other employee's account with DOR was an Access Control Custodian account that was not shut down on the last day of employment. Both of these accounts were systematically purged according to the February 4<sup>th</sup> BP89 report ("PYRL Access Data").

Since the data pull for this review on February 1<sup>st</sup>, two additional employees have moved agencies on February 17<sup>th</sup> and February 18<sup>th</sup> and as of March 1<sup>st</sup>, both of their accesses remain active with their previous agencies (AHCA and DLA).

### Users w/PYRL Access that Cannot be Validated (3)

There were three user ID's identified that could not be validated via People First and/or PYRL. They are listed with DMS as "Problem Resolution Specialist" in their description. I received confirmation from DMS/People First that they are all contractors with Alight/NGA (NorthGate Arinso) Human Resources. They support the Refunds and Reconciliation teams in Operations within the People First Service Center.

## Recommendations

### Fails to meet PYRL description requirements per the Payroll Preparation Manual

Agencies should complete all updates and maintain these practices throughout the state (if the agency is not centralized) in the future to assist with the auditing of system accesses and employment verifications.

### Separated Employees w/Active PYRL Access

Agencies should ensure that Job changes and terminations be immediately managed by removing affected employees' access using the access control function. There is no rule preventing an agency from removing an outgoing employee's access prior to the last day employed, that decision can be made based on the agency's business needs, however the employee's access should be removed no later than their last day in their position.

### Agency Responses

Each agency with a finding was sent a notification email of findings and was asked to review all of their current users with PYRL access and make the necessary adjustments to adhere to the requirement shown in Volume V, Section 1(C) of the Payroll Preparation Manual, as well as agencies with separated employees and the timely removal of access upon separation.

Most agencies acknowledged the findings and replied with assurances that the findings were corrected, or that a process was put in place to better assist with the removal of a separated user.

The remaining few agencies that did not respond but did update their users accounts to adhere to the requirements per the next Active Access Control (BP89) RDS report (July 22<sup>nd</sup>) that was run the following week, include the Dept. of State and Dept. of Management Services.

Agencies with a finding that did not acknowledge the findings and also did not respond, include the Dept. of Education and Dept. of Military Affairs.